Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment
An IISS Strategic Dossier Press
Statement by Dr John Chipman, IISS Director http://www.iiss.org
Our objective has been to assess, as accurately and dispassionately as possible,
Iraq’s current WMD capacities. The task is challenging. Although UN inspections of
Iraq produced a tremendous amount of technical information on the development, objectives
and relative capabilities of Iraq’s WMD and missile programmes, Iraq made
every effort to obscure its past, obstruct dismantlement of its present assets, and retain
capabilities for the future. Since Iraq forced inspections to end in December
1998, it has become more difficult to learn about its activities and assess its
capabilities.
Questions include:
The extent to which Iraq has taken advantage of the absence of inspectors to begin
reconstituting its programmes
The extent to which Iraq has been able to obtain vital foreign assistance through cracks
in the sanction regime
The degree to which Iraq has been able to conduct activities that will have evaded
sophisticated surveillance techniques
The degree to which information gathered from defectors on Iraq’s programmes can
still be relied upon
Recognising these difficulties, the IISS set out to build its assessment on a strong
foundation of technical expertise. We have drawn on recognised technical experts, with
long field experience in UNSCOM and IAEA inspections, to provide initial drafts on
Iraq’s nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programmes. We have
applied our own expertise and those of many other experts in scrutinising each draft. Each
chapter covers the historical development of Iraq’s technical capabilities through to
the end of the Gulf War. The Dossier then assesses the disarmament achievements and the
kind of activity that Iraq was able to conceal or continue during the inspection period
ending in December 1998. We then carefully analyse what Iraq may have been able to
accomplish in each of these key weapon areas since 1998.
UN Resolutions and the History
of Inspections
Our report begins by recalling the relevant Security Council Resolutions that followed the
cessation of hostilities at the end of the Gulf War. UN Security Council Resolution 687
passed on 3 April 1991, established the formal ceasefire between Coalition forces and
Iraq. Key amongst the ceasefire terms was the prohibition against Iraq’s retaining,
acquiring or developing WMD and long range missiles. In addition there was a demand that
Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its WMD
under international supervision. Iraq was required to submit within 15 days a declaration
of all WMD sites and items. In the period that followed passage of the resolution Iraq did
everything in its power to avoid these and other obligations placed upon it.
From the start of the inspections by UNSCOM in 1991 through to the demise of UNSCOM in
1998 Iraq practised a series of measures designed to prevent the UN inspectors from
finding the full range and extent of its proscribed WMD and missile programmes. Indeed,
this activity was so intense, that UNSCOM had to set up a special unit to counter
Iraq’s efforts. While there were notable successes in defeating Iraqi concealment
efforts, many others failed.
The UNSCOM experience demonstrates that no on-site inspections of Iraq’s WMD
programmes can succeed unless inspectors develop an imaginative and carefully co-ordinated
counter-concealment strategy.
On 17 December 1999, one year after UNSCOM left, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
1284, reaffirming all previous UNSC resolutions, disbanding UNSCOM, and establishing the
UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission or UNMOVIC.
Iraq has continued to reject Resolution 1284 on the grounds that it does not set a clear
timetable or criteria for lifting sanctions.
If UNMOVIC inspectors were ever to go to Iraq, it would take them time to develop and
refine the unique inspection techniques required. In addition, it would take them
considerable field experience to develop the necessary tradecraft to deal with Iraqi
obfuscation efforts. Certainly, the strength of Baghdad’s commitment to possess WMD
is measurable in part by its efforts to resist unfettered UN inspections.
Biological Weapons
Our Dossier then goes on to examine the much more difficult subject of biological weapons.
In the mid 1980s, Iraq’s BW programme had picked up speed and by 1989, Iraq began to
produce BW agent in volume. After its invasion of Kuwait, Baghdad stepped up large scale
BW agent production and assembled rudimentary BW munitions. These weapons were distributed
to military units, who were delegated to use them if coalition forces advanced on Baghdad
or used nuclear weapons. Most of Iraq’s key BW facilities, which had been
successfully hidden from Western intelligence agencies, escaped attack during the Gulf
War. After UN inspections began, Baghdad continued to conceal its BW programme until 1995.
By the time UNSCOM’s work ended in 1998, it was only able to account for a portion of
Iraq’s BW munitions, bulk agents, and growth media.
Again, Iraq retains the expertise and industrial capability to produce agents quickly and
in volume if desired. Moreover, Iraq has had a decade of experience countering
intelligence and developing effective concealment methods. Western intelligence agencies
take seriously defector information to the effect that underground facilities have been
built and a fleet of mobile biological production laboratories deployed, though these are
hard to confirm.
Iraq can certainly produce new stocks of bulk BW agent, including botulinum toxin and
anthrax with its existing facilities, equipment and materials. BW agent could be delivered
by short range munitions including artillery shells and rockets. Delivery by ballistic
missile is more problematic given that much of the agent would be destroyed on impact and
the immediate area of dispersal would be small. Civilian casualties could still be in the
hundreds or thousands. Refurbished L-29 trainer aircraft could operate as weapons-carrying
UAVs with a range of over 600km. Such UAVs, in theory, would be considerably more
effective than ballistic missiles in delivering CBW. Commando and terrorist attack is also
possible.
Our net assessment of the current situation is that:
Iraq has probably retained substantial growth media and BW agent (perhaps thousands of
litres of anthrax) from pre 1991 stocks. The regime is capable of resuming BW Agent
production on short notice (in weeks) from existing civilian facilities. It could have
produced thousands of litres of anthrax, botulinum toxin and other agents since 1998.
Actual stocks cannot be known. Iraqi production of viral agents is unknown as is the
question of whether the regime possesses small pox.
Chemical Weapons
Compared to its efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons, Iraq’s chemical
weapons (CW) programme was the first to reach full maturity, and included riot control,
blister and nerve agents in a variety of munitions including missile warheads, aerial
bombs, rockets and artillery shells. Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against
Iranian troops from 1982 onwards. Indeed Iraq emerged from the war with Iran with the
largest and most advanced chemical weapons capability in the Middle East at that time.
Between 1988 and 1991 Iraq made further progress in developing binary chemical munitions,
producing and weaponising an advanced nerve agent, VX, and developing an indigenous
production base for key CW precursors. The Gulf War however devastated Iraq’s primary
CW production facilities and a large portion of its stockpile of CW munitions. Through to
1998, UNSCOM was able to dispose of large quantities of CW munitions, bulk agent,
precursors and production equipment that were not destroyed in combat.
Here too, Iraq was almost certainly able to conceal and salvage key aspects of its CW
programme, including CW munitions, agent and precursors. Iraq has retained the experienced
personnel, know how and chemical industrial capability to reconstitute elements of its CW
programme on an emergency basis.
Iraq could have retained stable precursors for a few hundred tonnes of sarin and
cyclosarin and a similar amount of VX. Weaponisation of any retained material would not
pose a significant obstacle.
Assessing the production of new CW agent and precursors depends on determining the degree
to which Iraq will have chosen to mobilise its civilian chemical industry to produce these
capabilities. Without inspectors present, Iraq would not find it difficult to build on pre
1991 stocks and produce and weaponise fresh agent.
Unless Iraq has advanced beyond the impact fusing and warhead design of its 1990 era
special warheads, its ability to disseminate effectively CW agent on ballistic missiles is
questionable, since so much agent would be destroyed on impact. Iraq’s known ability
to marry chemical warheads to its rocket and artillery pieces (with ranges up to 30,000
metres) could complicate operations for opposing forces, who would be required to wear
protective gear.
Our net assessment of the current situation is that:
Iraq has probably retained a few hundred tonnes of mustard and precursors for a few
hundred tonnes of sarin/cyclosarin and perhaps similar amounts of VX from pre-1991 stocks.
It is capable of resuming CW production on short notice (months) from existing civilian
facilities. It could have produced hundreds of tonnes of agent (mustard and nerve agents)
since 1998. In these circumstances, it is not possible accurately to estimate present
stocks.
Ballistic Missiles
A great deal of attention needs also to be placed on Iraq’s ballistic missile
capabilities. Iraq is proscribed by UN Resolutions from possessing ballistic missiles with
a range greater than 150km. In the mid 1970s Iraq began to import Scud B missiles with a
range of 300km from the Soviet Union and ultimately acquired 819. In the mid 1980s Iraq
worked to modify the Scud missiles in order to double their range. The new missile, called
the al Hussein, with a range of 650km, was used during the war against Iran.
During the 1991 Gulf war an al-Hussein missile strike against a US military facility in
Saudi Arabia caused the greatest number of US casualties in any single incident, and the
mobility of the launchers allowed them to evade allied planes, which were unable to
destroy any mobile missiles during the war.
In the wake of the Gulf War, much of Iraq’s missile infrastructure lay in ruins. (The
US and UK, during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, attacked a number of missile
related facilities). During the inspections period Iraq continued to conduct small scale
covert research and development on proscribed missiles. In addition, Iraq continued
missile related procurement efforts. Despite international sanctions, Iraq covertly
negotiated transactions with more than 500 companies. Its interests included liquid
propellant engine parts, solid propulsion technology, guidance and control equipment, and
many other items. In one case complete gyroscopes recovered from Russian long range
ballistic missiles were even smuggled into Iraq and later recovered by UNSCOM in December
1995.
UNSCOM attempted to account for all imported missiles and for indigenously produced
missiles, but that accounting was incomplete and it must be presumed that Iraq has been
able to retain some of its proscribed missiles. Also, it is likely that Iraqi engineers
will have been able to increase the propellant tanks capacities in the al Samoud to reach
ranges of some 200km with a few hundred kilogrammes payload suitable for CBW delivery.
Our net assessment of the current situation is that:
Iraq has probably retained a small force of about a dozen 650km range al-Hussein missiles.
These could strike Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Kuwait. Could be armed with CBW
warheads.
Iraq does not possess facilities to produce long range missiles and it would require
several years and extensive foreign assistance to construct such facilities.
Iraq may, in addition, have a small number of al Samoud missiles with ranges of up to
200km able to strike Kuwait but only if deployed within the southern no fly zone
It is capable of manufacturing rudimentary CBW warheads; its development of more advanced
designs is unknown
Iraq can convert civilian vehicles to provide mobile launchers for its ballistic missiles
Conclusion
In conclusion, war, sanctions and inspections have reversed and retarded, but not
eliminated Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long range missile
capacities, nor have they removed Baghdad’s enduring interest in developing these
capacities. The retention of WMD capacities by Iraq is self-evidently the core objective
of the regime, for it has sacrificed all other domestic and foreign policy goals
to this singular aim. It has retained this single objective, and pursued it in breach of
the ceasefire and UN Security Council Resolutions that brought a conditional end to the
1991 Gulf War. Over more than eleven years the Iraqi regime has sought to evade its
obligations and undermine support for the sanctions and inspections regime meant to
eliminate its WMD capacities and contain its ambitions. Iraq has fought a relatively
successful diplomatic war of attrition. It is worth recalling that the international
debate 18 months ago was centred on how sanctions against Iraq might be relaxed, and
inspections concluded with some dispatch in light of the dwindling willingness to support
the containment policy developed in 1991.
Today, after four years without inspections, there can be no certainty about the extent of
Iraq’s current capacities. A reasonable net assessment is that Iraq has no nuclear
weapons but could build one quickly if it acquired sufficient fissile material. It has
extensive biological weapons capabilities and a smaller chemical weapons stockpile. It has
a small force of ballistic missiles with a range of 650km, that are capable of delivering
CBW warheads, and has prepared other delivery methods for CBW, including manned aircraft
and UAVs. Sooner or later, it seems likely that the current Iraqi regime will eventually
achieve its objectives.
In compiling this Strategic Dossier, the IISS has sought to put the best available facts
on this difficult issue before the wider public. This Strategic Dossier does not attempt
to make a case, either way, as to whether Saddam Hussein’s WMD arsenal is a casus
belli per se. Wait and the threat will grow; strike and the threat may be used. Clearly,
governments have a pressing duty to develop early a strategy to deal comprehensively with
this unique international problem.
Iraq WMD Dossier Statement Statement by IISS Director John Chipman
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment
An IISS Strategic Dossier Press Statement Dr John Chipman, IISS Director
http://www.iiss.org
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